Blow-up Weapons

Not exploding ones, weapons that are filled with air. There's an interesting article at BBC News about Russian inflatable weapons.

A turret appears, then out pops a long plastic gun barrel. This is an inflatable Russian tank. ... When the men pump up their next piece of plastic, this one expands into a S-300 rocket launcher, complete with giant truck and inflatable rockets. ... waiting to be blown up are inflatable MiG fighter jets - even entire Russian radar stations. ... They are made of a special material that tricks enemy radar and thermal imaging into thinking they are real weapons.

One thing that the Soviet military was very good at in World War Two was deception. They call it maskirovka, and it has been a fundamental feature of Soviet and now Russian military doctrine. As Globalsecurity.org points out,

The goal of maskirovka is to make the enemy concentrate his forces against false threats and uselessly expend his means of destruction on them. ... they also do it actively, through the use of dummy structures, electronic warfare, false maneuvers, and various other methods.

These blow-up dummies are cheap and have the potential to be extremely effective, not just in manipulating enemy intelligence/observations, but in causing significant diversions of resources away from real threats. These dummies might actually cause more problems for an opponent than some real weapon systems.

Incompetent Whiner-in-Chief

Since he's become president, rather than act as a leader, President Obama's first resort has been to whine, complain and blame others. The latest revelations from Bob Woodward's book provide more confirmation of the lack of leadership at the top. While running for president, Obama had all sorts of criticism for George Bush's war strategy. You might have thought that he'd take office knowing what he wanted to accomplish, with a plan ready to carry out. Instead, as Dick Cheney accurately pointed out, Obama spent months dithering over what to do in Afghanistan. 

Woodward's book reveals -- as many people had already observed -- that Obama didn't have the slightest idea what to do in Afghanistan, other than a vague notion of getting out as fast as possible. Obama's main "plan" was simply to "limit U.S. involvement and provide a way out," despite repeatedly bashing Bush for not putting enough emphasis on the war there. But even though he just wanted to run away, as most people suspected, he lacked the competence and leadership to force through some sort of exit strategy. According to Woodward's account, he allowed himself to be bullied by his military advisers against his own wishes. Instead of ordering them to come up with an exit plan, he was reduced to fighting a rear guard action aimed at limiting an increase in U.S. forces in the country. That's how we got to the typical political half-measure: an Afghan surge with less troops than the military wanted.

Read the article for yourself and remember that this man is supposed to be commander-in-chief, not a community organizer conducting negotiations with slumlords over the latest rent increases.

The Huge Saudi Arms Deal

I have mixed feelings about the proposed major arm deal with Saudi Arabia. On the one hand Saudi Arabia does function as a U.S. ally in the region, and as such we would prefer it to be a strong ally, with significant military capability.

A senior Defense Department official said the administration is prepared to authorize the sale of as many as 84 F-15 fighter jets and three types of helicopters: 70 upgraded F-15s, 70 Apaches, 72 Black Hawks and 36 Little Birds to the Saudis. ... Another deal, the senior Pentagon official said, could include selling the Saudis naval and ballistic missile-defense weapons systems that could be worth tens of billions of dollars more.

If those reports are correct, that's a huge arms purchase. But despite our alliance with Saudi Arabia, I'm not thrilled with the sort of reasoning excerpted below.

Defense industry analysts said the sale of the aircraft is a key to U.S. efforts to boost support from Arab allies against Iran.

"The U.S. is trying to create the strongest effort to deter and contain Iran," said Anthony Cordesman, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "If you look at all of these sales, the U.S. is working to create a Saudi Air Force that is far more capable than Iran. These sales help give Saudi Arabia the capability to convince Iran that it can't use missiles or air power against Saudi Arabia or its neighbors."

I'm all for containing Iran, but I think Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are weak reeds to rely on. And we already have a far stronger ally in the Middle East. It's called Israel, a country with proven advanced military capabilities. I see Saudi Arabia as a hollow shell, with a high-tech force that has little staying power. And there is another factor as well.

Saudi Arabia, and most of our other Arab allies are one Islamic revolution away from turning into enemies. If we are prepared to make this sort of strategic investment in Saudi Arabia, we also need to be willing to do whatever it takes to maintain the House of Saud in power. What that means is committing the U.S. to propping up an autocratic regime, and acting to assist it in the event that it faces a popular revolution. I have no confidence that the U.S. government is willing to do that. It is much more likely that we would do what we did with Iran, where we abandoned our ally the Shah to his fate, and let Iran turn into an enemy. The more advanced U.S. weaponry Saudi Arabia has if & when that happens, the worse it will be.

Unfounded Assumptions About Obama & Afghanistan

There's a provocative article in The New Republic by historian Andrew Bacevich, called "Non-Believer." Bacevich advances a theory that goes something like this. George Bush was an incompetent idiot, but he went to war in Iraq because he firmly believed he was doing the right thing. Obama is smarter and more competent, but he's escalated the war in Afghanistan even though he doesn't believe in it. He's waging war there because he's too cynical and gutless to get out. It's hard to know where to start in pointing out Bacevich's many extremely dubious assumptions.  Let's start with this one. After describing Bush as a "well-intentioned fool," Bacevich writes about Obama.

Barack Obama is anything but a fool.

Really? Maybe if you ignore all the evidence of his presidency. 

Much as Iraq was Bush’s war, Afghanistan has become Obama’s war. Yet the president clearly wants nothing more than to rid himself of his war.

That's a pretty big assumption. Interestingly enough, it's shared by many on the right.  

Obama has prolonged and escalated a conflict in which he himself manifestly does not believe.

Is there any way to know whether or not that's actually true? Again, that's a huge assumption that claims unwarranted insight into the president's brain. Bacevich provides no evidence for his position, other than a single meaningless line spoken by Obama.  The actual evidence clearly contradicts such a view. Obama took a ridiculously long time to reevaluate U.S. strategy for Afghanistan. After that time, he signed on with the counterinsurgency (COIN) school of thought, which specifically required an escalation of U.S. forces, and even more nation-building efforts. He went with General McChyrstal, a leading proponent of that strategy, and in large part adopted his recommendations. Those are not the actions of someone who "manifestly" does not believe in the war effort. Bacevich's assertion is ludicrous, which is why he has to pretend to some special insight into what the president is secretly thinking.

Yet the expectations of change that vaulted him to the presidency went well beyond the issue of priorities. Obama’s supporters were counting on him to bring to the White House an enlightened moral sensibility: He would govern differently not only because he was smarter than his predecessor but because he responded to a different—and truer—inner compass.

People who actually believed such nonsense -- and presumably that includes Bacevich -- have no business referring to anyone else as fools. Bacevich was apparently completely clueless about Barack Obama before the election, and now he claims special knowledge of his inner thoughts. 

Obama doesn’t want to be in Afghanistan any more than Benjamin Netanyahu wants to be in the West Bank. Yet like the Israeli prime minister, the president lacks the guts to get out.

Maybe he doesn't want to get out because once he became president, he was forced to face reality, and forced to recognize that a precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a major strategic defeat for the U.S. Maybe as president, with all the information and advice at his disposal, he feels that he can no longer adopt the simple-minded viewpoint of naive and ignorant anti-war types. But Bacevich prefers to believe that Obama really thinks the way he does, but is cynically prolonging the war purely for political purposes. His entire article is a typical example of imputing bad motives to those you disagree with politically.

The question demands to be asked: Who is more deserving of contempt? The commander-in-chief who sends young Americans to die for a cause, however misguided, in which he sincerely believes? Or the commander-in-chief who sends young Americans to die for a cause in which he manifestly does not believe and yet refuses to forsake?

What's contemptible is a professional historian who can't tell the difference between his own assumptions and assertions and facts. 

What to Do About Turkey?

There has been much nonsense written regarding Turkey in the aftermath of the flotilla incident. Here's just one example from an Israeli no less.

Monday's botched commando raid on the Gaza-bound flotilla has proven disastrous for Israel. World public opinion has united in condemning the Jewish state and the U.N. Security Council has already demanded an inquiry. Closer to home, the strategic alliance that Israel had painstakingly forged with Turkey is in tatters.

The strategic alliance between Israel and Turkey has been dead for quite some time. The Islamist government of Turkey has for years now pursued a policy of using Gaza and the Palestinians as a weapon against Israel, and as a lever to advance its own power in the region at the expense of both Israel and the U.S.  This policy has included close relations with Iran to the extent of attempting to undermine even the mild sanctions advanced by the Obama administration. Yet from many pundits you still see a pretend view of Turkey, as if it were still the 1990s, with Turkey a solid ally of the U.S. and a friend to Israel.

It has been the shift in the Turkish government, from secular and western-oriented, to Islamist and focused on regional power that has produced not only the rift with Israel, but its transformation from strong U.S. ally to neutral bordering on hostile. There is little Israel could have done to change this dynamic, and any Israeli still pretending that Turkey is some sort of strategic partner rather than a dangerous threat is a deluded fool. The idea that Turkey actually cares about the Palestinian self-determination and humanitarian issues is utterly laughable. All you have to do is look at its savage repression of the Kurds. The Turks have joined Arabs in using the Palestinians as a weapon against Israel, going so far as to help organize the latest blockade-breaking effort in support of Hamas.

So what should the U.S. do? First and foremost we need to recognize reality. And reality is that Turkey is no longer an ally, a strategic partner, or a friend to the U.S. Friends don't ally themselves with rogue states who are open enemies of America (Iran), attempt to destroy the legitimacy of the key U.S. ally in the region, and support anti-American terrorist organizations. Far from being a friend, Turkey is now a problem and a threat to U.S. interests in the region. It's time we recognized that situation and planned accordingly.

One of the main reasons Turkey has felt confident in acting against U.S. interests is the Obama administration's projection of weakness abroad. None of our enemies, rivals and potentially hostile states fears Obama in the slightest. They know his instinctive desire to appease, naivete, inexperience, extreme reluctance to act unilaterally, self-delusion and wishful thinking cripple U.S. power. The overwhelming power of the U.S. is useless without the will to wield it in the service of U.S. interests. Turkey, like many other states, has every reason to feel confident that it can do whatever it wants as long as Obama is in charge of U.S. foreign policy. Weakness breeds aggression, and U.S. weakness risks a Middle East war, something that is definitely not in our interests. There have been reports and speculation that Turkey might actually send a naval escort with another Gaza flotilla. Attempting to break the Gaza blockade with naval force would be an act of war against Israel. A war between Turkey and Israel, which would probably draw in Arab states as well, would be a enormous disaster for U.S. interests. It seems unlikely, but given the current conditions it is conceivable.

One way to avoid conflicts and all-out war is to establish clarity in foreign policy. If the possible reaction of a great power is unclear, an aggressive state might be inclined to gamble. What would happen in the event that Turkish naval forces clashed with Israeli over the Gaza blockade? What is the position of the U.S.? In the aftermath of the latest incident the U.S. should be holding high-level talks with Turkey, and making our position absolutely clear, so that there will be no misunderstanding or miscalculation. Most of this should take place behind the scenes, but it should be forceful and direct. Turkey should be told that regardless of our disagreements with certain aspects of Israeli policy, U.S. power stands firmly behind Israel. We recognize that a Turkish military attempt to break the Gaza blockade is an act of war against Israel, and it will be treated accordingly. Depending on the Turkish response, this message could be reinforced by sending a powerful U.S. naval force to the Eastern Mediterranean. There are all sorts of other issues that should be raised at such a conference between the U.S. and Turkey, but I'll leave it at that for the moment since this post is getting pretty long. Wars often begin through miscalculation and delusions about the possible actions of states with interests in the matter. It's time to for Obama to use his "let me be clear" line for something meaningful.

Nuclear Weapons: The First Use Option

The U.S. nuclear posture review is coming up, and Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, has an op-ed in USA Today arguing that we should abandon our current policy and adopt a "no first use" pledge. This is a foolish idea based on at least two false assumptions.

Harrison asserts that a right of first use is "is incompatible with the goal of non-proliferation." This is obvious nonsense. It's completely delusional to assume that countries like Iran and North Korea primarily want nuclear weapons out of fear of a U.S. nuclear first strike. There are many reasons countries might seek to acquire such weapons, and one of the main ones is that the possession of nuclear weapons is a strong deterrent to conventional attack. Rogue states fearing attack or invasion, and facing the overwhelming conventional power of the United States, have a clear reason to want nuclear weapons. Their reasons have little or nothing to do with whether or not the U.S. retains the option to strike first with nuclear weapons.

The article also appears to rest on a fundamentally mistaken underlying assumption that is common on the left when considering weapons of any kind -- the idea that the weapons themselves are the problem. In my view, the whole notion of nuclear proliferation as an evil that must be fought, is misguided. The problem isn't the weapons, it's the states which possess them. Should we be worried about nuclear weapons in the hands of Britain, France, or other allies of the U.S.? What if Switzerland decided to build nuclear weapons? Would that be in any way similar to the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of Iranian mullahs? Pretending that nuclear proliferation in general is the problem, instead of rogue state possession of nuclear weapons, is a common error in perspective. 

U.S. nuclear weapons, just like other weapons in our arsenal, should be employed in accordance with U.S. interests. It is possible that a situation might arise where we might need to strike first with nuclear weapons. We can't foresee the future. Constricting U.S. strategic options by making some sort of pledge is both stupid and dangerous -- especially since the supposed benefits of such a pledge are based on false assumptions and delusions.

reaffirming the right of first use would say, in effect, that the United States has no apologies for Hiroshima and Nagasaki and is ready for a repeat performance whenever and wherever it chooses.

That's exactly what we should say.

Why Russia & China Favor a Nuclear Iran

There's an interesting article in the New Republic called, "Bombs Away: The real reason why Russia and China aren’t interested in stopping Iran’s nuclear program." The author, Matthew Kroenig, rejects the common explanation that Russian and Chinese economic ties with Iran are the primary reason for their assistance with its nuclear aspirations, and for their reluctance to do anything about it. Instead he looks toward strategic reasons. He argues that both countries see a nuclear Iran as a constraint on U.S. power in the Middle East -- a constraint that will not affect Russian & China because they lack force projection capabilities in the region.

An Iranian bomb, then, won’t disadvantage China or Russia. In fact, it might even help them. Neither country has hidden its desire to hem in America’s unilateral ability to project power, and a nuclear-armed Iran would certainly mean a more constrained U.S. military in the Middle East. Indeed, at times during the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing and Moscow aided Tehran with important aspects of its nuclear program.

It's nice to see an argument on this issue that gets away from economic determinism and looks toward power politics and grand strategy. I think the author is probably correct in his view of Russian & Chinese motives. Where I disagree with him is on his analysis of the U.S. side of the equation. Here he offers a reverse of Chinese & Russian motivations. The U.S. opposes proliferation in Iran because it constrains U.S. power projection in the region.

Of course, there are the concerns of accidental nuclear detonation, nuclear terrorism, or even nuclear war. But these are all extremely low probability events. The primary threat of nuclear proliferation is that it constrains the freedom of powerful states to use or threaten to use force abroad. ... In nearly every historical instance of proliferation, beginning with China in the 1960s, the United States opposed nuclear proliferation in large part because it wanted to preserve its military freedom of action. ... Although Washington might not have immediate plans to use force in the Middle East, it would like to keep the option open.

Although I agree that this reasoning is certainly part of the U.S. desire to block Iranian nuclear weapons, I think he ignores other obvious reasons of greater significance. First and foremost, Iran is a rogue state ruled by radical Islamic fanatics hostile to the U.S., and has been conducting a low level proxy war against U.S. forces in the region. It's not really necessary to look for deep strategic reasons to understand why the U.S. would want to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the mullahs. If Iran was ruled by a more responsible government that just happened to be aligned against the U.S., the author's argument would be more convincing. 

Second, Kroenig ignores the threat to Israel in his calculations. This is a key reason the U.S. opposes a nuclear weapon in Iranian hands. Israel rightly sees such weapons as an existential threat, and the U.S. would rather not be sucked into a Middle East war if the Israelis decide they must act to preempt the threat.  And third, there is the fear that even if war doesn't break out right way, that an Iranian bomb will precipitate a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race, with other countries feeling that they need to obtain weapons, leading to a general destabilization of the region with unknown consequences. 

In my opinion, the nature of the Iranian regime, its hostility toward the U.S., the threat to Israel, the fear of being drawn into a war, and worries about the stability of the region as a whole are far more significant motivations for U.S. opposition to Iranian nuclear arms than our desire to maintain future force projection capabilities in the region.

Indian Quick Strike Strategy

I just noticed an article at the Times of India detailing Indian war doctrine, which underwent a shift following the 2001 terrorist attack on parliament. In the aftermath, India concluded that its mobilization was too slow, allowing the enemy (Pakistan) time to react, and opening up a window for international intervention to forestall Indian military action. According to the article, current Indian doctrine calls for rapid mobilization, and overwhelming offensive action. It's described as "`pro-active' war strategy to mobilise fast and strike hard to pulverise the enemy," from a "cold start."

The plan now is to launch self-contained and highly-mobile `battle groups', with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours.

Although it makes sense from a military perspective, you have to wonder if such a strategy might make war more likely. If a major terrorist act tied to Pakistan strikes India, will India launch a rapid attack before all the details are in? Obviously it didn't happen after the Mumbai terrorist attack, but the next time could be different. At any event, the article is an interesting glimpse of Indian strategic thinking.

All-out Attack on Counterinsurgency Strategy

Ralph Peters has been writing provocative articles about Afghanistan for quite awhile, and his latest, "Blood for nothing," is an all-out attack on the counterinsurgency strategy advocated by General McChrystal and others.  Here are some key excerpts,

Our soldiers are dying for a fad, not for a strategy. Our vaunted counterinsurgency doctrine is the military equivalent of hula hoops, pet rocks and Beanie Babies: an oddity that caught the Zeitgeist.

He argues that we are "throwing away soldiers' lives for theories that just don't work." Peters blasts the proponents of counterinsurgency,

Our counterinsurgency (COIN) theory -- hatched by military pseudo-intellectuals and opportunists -- has no serious historical basis. It ignores the uncomfortable lessons of 3,000 years of fighting insurgencies and terrorists. Its authors claim Vietnam and Algeria as success stories.

But what about the success in Iraq you ask?

As for the claim that COIN worked in Iraq, it's nonsense. First, Iraq ain't exactly out of the woods. Second, what turned the tide against al Qaeda was . . . al Qaeda. The troop surge helped, but wasn't decisive. We were blessed with enemies so monstrous they alienated the Iraqis they claimed to champion -- and the Iraqis turned against the foreign terrorists.

So what does Peters recommend?

This time around, Vice President Joe Biden happens to be right: We have to focus on destroying our true enemies -- al Qaeda -- and not on naive efforts to turn Afghanistan into Montclair, NJ. Republicans need to stop and smell the ruins of 9/11.

He concludes by asking for top generals to speak out,

Killing our nation's enemies always makes sense. Sacrificing our troops for the Pentagon's equivalent of Beanie Babies is despicable. Won't a single four-star general stand up and be counted?

Read the whole article. One thing I love about Peters is that he pulls no punches. I wish Colonel David Hackworth were still alive. I would love to hear his take on the debate over Afghanistan strategy.