The Latest on Iran & Nuclear Weapons

Over at In From the Cold, there's a look at the latest on Iran's nuclear weapon program. The news isn't good.

Using data released last month by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and the operations of its nuclear program, U.S. weapons expert Gregory Jones calculates it could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb in just eight weeks. ... According to Mr. Jones, there is nothing the U.S. or Israel can do to stop Iran from producing nuclear weapons--short of a military occupation. Since the odds of that happening are virtually nil, Jones believes an Iranian bomb is a foregone conclusion.

As the post notes, if these recent assessments are correct, it looks like the cyber attacks and various covert actions against Iran have been less successful than originally thought. According to a study by the RAND Corporation, attempts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear capability can already be considered a failure. Here's what RAND recommends.

The goal of U.S. foreign policy should now shift to dissuade Iran from taking the next step of making a weapon, the study says, adding if that fails, Washington should have a back-up strategy to deter a nuclear-armed Iran.

If we couldn't talk them into giving up their nuclear aspirations, it is equally unlikely that we can somehow persuade then not to take the final step. Rather than continuing with our official policy of wishful thinking, we should recognize reality and get ready to implement a deterrent strategy. In the meantime we should step up covert action aimed at sabotaging all elements of the Iranian nuclear program.

A Critical Look at the Arguments in Favor of START

There's a joint op-ed in today's Washington Post by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger and Colin Powell called, "The Republican case for ratifying New START." Leaving aside the fact that at least one of these men, Colin Powell, is a shill for the Obama administration and a true Republican In Name Only, let's look at their reasons for supporting the treaty.  

The world is safer today because of the decades-long effort to reduce its supply of nuclear weapons.

It's not a good idea to start off an argument with a baseless assertion. There's no evidence at all that the various arms control agreements have made the world one bit safer. We are safer from the threat of a massive nuclear war because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. But of course even that collapse has given rise to other potential nuclear threats. 

[The New START Treaty] is a modest and appropriate continuation of the START I treaty that expired almost a year ago.

So what? We should continue it just to continue it?

It reduces the number of nuclear weapons that each side deploys while enabling the United States to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent and preserving the flexibility to deploy those forces as we see fit.

You know what else preserves our flexibility? Not signing treaties that might hinder our options.

The commander of our nuclear forces has testified that the 1,550 warheads allowed under this treaty are sufficient for all our missions - and seven former nuclear commanders agree.

So by that logic, if 1,550 are sufficient, wouldn't it be better to have more?

The defense secretary, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the head of the Missile Defense Agency - all originally appointed by a Republican president - argue that New START is essential for our national defense.

What an utterly ridiculous assertion. This treaty has nothing to do with strengthening our national defense. It's a purely diplomatic maneuver that at best won't harm our national defense.

The most important thing is to have bipartisan support for the treaty, as previous nuclear arms treaties did.

If you want bipartisan support, then don't try to get a treaty through a lame-duck session of Congress.

Second, New START preserves our ability to deploy effective missile defenses. The testimonies of our military commanders and civilian leaders make clear that the treaty does not limit U.S. missile defense plans.

Really? How about reading what you write next?

Although the treaty prohibits the conversion of existing launchers for intercontinental and submarine-based ballistic missiles, our military leaders say they do not want to do that because it is more expensive and less effective than building new ones for defense purposes.

So actually the treaty does in fact limit missile defense plans, just not the ones we happen to favor at the current time. But missile defense is a work in progress. We don't need to impose artificial limitations without good reason.

Finally, the Obama administration has agreed to provide for modernization of the infrastructure essential to maintaining our nuclear arsenal.

Well that's just great. But we could and should do that anyway. It has nothing to do with needing to sign a new treaty with Russia.

some question why an arms control treaty with Russia matters. It matters because it is in both parties' interest that there be transparency and stability in their strategic nuclear relationship.

Ok, that's a reasonable argument. But now let's ruin it by following it with this:

It also matters because Russia's cooperation will be needed if we are to make progress in rolling back the Iranian and North Korean programs. Russian help will be needed to continue our work to secure "loose nukes" in Russia and elsewhere. And Russian assistance is needed to improve the situation in Afghanistan, a breeding ground for international terrorism.

Oh come on. Does any of those men actually believe the nonsense they are spouting? I seriously doubt it. Russia has its own interests in securing loose nukes. Russia isn't going to be the slightest bit of help in Afghanistan or North Korea, and it's part of the problem with Iran. 

Obviously, the United States does not sign arms control agreements just to make friends. Any treaty must be considered on its merits.

That's not at all obvious. If you consider the treaty on just its merits, it makes little sense. You then have to ask, why are we imposing limitations on our defense capabilities for little return? 

But we have here an agreement that is clearly in our national interest, and we should consider the ramifications of not ratifying it.

If it was clearly in our national interest there wouldn't be any debate about it. My prior position on this treaty was that it was essentially harmless. But after reading such bad arguments in favor of it, I'm beginning to question that notion. The main reasons to sign this treaty are to stay on decent terms with Russia, avoid any sort of new nuclear arms race, and to have access to good intelligence on Russia's nuclear arsenal. These arguments are mentioned in the editorial, but are buried under the unfounded assertions, wishful thinking and hyperbolic nonsense about how supposedly important this treaty is to U.S. national security. If I'm a Republican lawmaker reading this editorial, it's going to make me take a harder look at the new START treaty. It certainly wouldn't push me toward speeding it into passage.

Iran Set to Open a New Target

No, not a store. According to Russia, Iran is set to start-up its first nuclear power plant next week.

Rosatom spokesman Sergei Novikov said Friday that uranium fuel shipped by Russia will be loaded into the Bushehr reactor on Aug. 21, beginning the startup process. ...“From that moment the Bushehr plant will be officially considered a nuclear-energy installation,”

The plant is painted with a gigantic bullseye that can be seen from the air. Not really, but it might as well have one. I'm not in favor of strike on Iran, but if there is one, I expect this facility to become a smoking pile of radioactive rubble.

It would be interesting if Iran's brand-new first nuclear plant were to suffer a mysterious, catastrophic accident, perhaps a massive internal explosion, or some sort of cooling system failure that led to a meltdown. Aside from destroying the plant, such an accident would probably kill scientists, engineers and technicians important to Iran's nuclear program. It might even be blamed on shoddy Russian engineering, poor workmanship or the use of cut-rate materials in construction, damaging the close relationship between Russia & Iran on nuclear projects -- especially if the cause of the accident is difficult to determine.

The Truman Center for Nuclear Peace

The U.S. attended the 65th anniversary ceremonies commemorating the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. It's memorable because the U.S. has never attended before, and because the Obama administration managed to resist what was probably an urge to apologize for taking a justifiable wartime action.

In other news, a private American group announced that they have purchased land, and plan to build a 15 story community center two blocks from ground zero in Hiroshima. The structure will be called the Truman Center for Nuclear Peace. The promoters hope to spread their message that nuclear weapons not only brought an end to the Pacific War, but kept the peace throughout the Cold War. Their organization stresses the peaceful purpose of nuclear weapons, and the developers believe this new center will help create greater understanding between Japanese and Americans on the issue of nuclear weapons. Initial reports show strong Japanese opposition to such a project, with many labeling it the Ground Zero Bomb Center.

Although recent polls show that more than 50% strongly oppose the Truman Center for Nuclear Peace, it has achieved remarkable support from local politicians and political pundits, particularly on the left. They point out that the center isn't about the bombing, but about peace, and that it isn't actually on ground zero -- it's a whole two blocks away. They derisively dismiss any and all opposition as ignorant anti-American bigotry. But opposition continues to grow.



For the clueless... everything but the first paragraph is satire.

The Threat of Nuclear Terror

Rarely is there anything worth reading at the Huffington Post, but an article by Dan Agin is an exception. Agin argues that the most people are unaware of the threat of nuclear terrorism, that the government is doing little to prevent it, and that it's only a matter of time before we are hit.

sooner or later, if current trends continue, there will be a successful bomb explosion, and an explosion of more consequence than an explosion of fertilizer and propane gas alone. ... Our problem is not fertilizer but nuclear material.

As he points out, the main threat isn't that of a true nuclear explosion, but of a crude device packed with nuclear material.

although dirty bombs are often also called "nuclear" devices, the explosion of such a device does not involve nuclear events. They are really ordinary explosive material packed with radioactive material, the ordinary explosion dispersing the radioactive material over a wide range--contaminating everything, people, objects, the grass in the parks, and the lungs and bones of your children.

The terror spread by such a device would far exceed the actual immediate damage. But how likely is it that terrorists could obtain radioactive materials? That depends who you ask, and how secure you think nuclear materials are worldwide. But as Agin argues, it appears we aren't taking much in the way of precautions against such material being smuggled into the U.S.

the policy of random inspection of only a small fraction of the contents of inbound container ships is essentially a policy of exposing the largest American cities to nuclear roulette. Does it make sense to examine every individual who crosses the border but not every crate that crosses the border?

He closes with this prediction.

The first terrorist "nuclear" bomb will be a dirty bomb exploded at ground level, in an apartment or small house, in Manhattan or central London, or in a place like Brooklyn or Islington.

Double Wishful Thinking

Wishful thinking has been a key plank of Obama's foreign policy throughout his administration. But China has provided another reminder that reality differs sharply from the delusions of the Obama administration.

China insisted Tuesday that it has not shifted its approach on Iran's nuclear program, despite White House claims on Monday that Beijing had become more open to sanctions on Tehran.

Jiang Yu, a spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, told reporters in Beijing that "China has always believed that sanctions and pressure cannot fundamentally resolve the issue" of concern about Iran's nuclear program, according to the official New China News Agency.

This is an example of double wishful thinking. Obama is  operating under two sets of false assumptions. First is the idea that sanctions are going to do anything to stop Iran's nuclear program. Despite all evidence to the contrary, the administration continues to pretend that  Iranian nuclear ambitions can be derailed through some sort of sanctions.  In reality, there are only two things likely to disrupt Iranian plans: war, or some sort of radical change inside Iran itself. But the Obama administration isn't just content to cling to the comforting delusion that sanctions can solve the problem. It has to go further, and engage in wishful thinking about the involvement of countries like China. 

The Chinese have made it clear that they aren't interested in applying any sort of harsh sanctions to Iran, let alone ones that even in theory might have some chance of halting its nuclear program. Making a false statement that the Chinese are on board, only to have China come out and directly contradict the administration, is just one of the many illustrations of the bumbling incompetence of Obama's foreign policy. It's not the first time he's engaged in such a pretense about sanctions, only to be publicly contradicted.

The White House has recently asserted common ground with Moscow on the issue. Yet last week, in an appearance with Obama in Prague, Czech Republic, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stressed that there were limits to the sanctions that his country was willing to impose.

Wishful thinking about a policy based on wishful thinking. That's what passes for foreign policy in the Obama administration. 

Nuclear Posture Change

There has already been much written about Obama's change to the U.S. nuclear posture, so I'm going to be unusually brief. The changes are unnecessary, idiotic, and typical cluelessness by Obama. But they aren't surprising coming from someone whose main foreign policy ideas are based on appeasement, empty talk and wishful thinking. But how dangerous are they really?

If the U.S. is actually hit by a devastating chemical or biological attack, a nuclear response will probably be on the table anyway, no matter what our official nuclear posture states. As president, Obama has the authority to change this policy. A future president can change it right back. It's not the same as a massive new entitlement program that is immensely difficult to reverse. Some have pointed out that Obama's policy undercuts the whole idea of deterrence. That's true, but having a fool like Obama in power, someone who deliberately projects weakness to our enemies, is far worse for deterrence than any individual policy. The sooner he's out of office the better. 

Nuclear Weapons: The First Use Option

The U.S. nuclear posture review is coming up, and Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, has an op-ed in USA Today arguing that we should abandon our current policy and adopt a "no first use" pledge. This is a foolish idea based on at least two false assumptions.

Harrison asserts that a right of first use is "is incompatible with the goal of non-proliferation." This is obvious nonsense. It's completely delusional to assume that countries like Iran and North Korea primarily want nuclear weapons out of fear of a U.S. nuclear first strike. There are many reasons countries might seek to acquire such weapons, and one of the main ones is that the possession of nuclear weapons is a strong deterrent to conventional attack. Rogue states fearing attack or invasion, and facing the overwhelming conventional power of the United States, have a clear reason to want nuclear weapons. Their reasons have little or nothing to do with whether or not the U.S. retains the option to strike first with nuclear weapons.

The article also appears to rest on a fundamentally mistaken underlying assumption that is common on the left when considering weapons of any kind -- the idea that the weapons themselves are the problem. In my view, the whole notion of nuclear proliferation as an evil that must be fought, is misguided. The problem isn't the weapons, it's the states which possess them. Should we be worried about nuclear weapons in the hands of Britain, France, or other allies of the U.S.? What if Switzerland decided to build nuclear weapons? Would that be in any way similar to the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of Iranian mullahs? Pretending that nuclear proliferation in general is the problem, instead of rogue state possession of nuclear weapons, is a common error in perspective. 

U.S. nuclear weapons, just like other weapons in our arsenal, should be employed in accordance with U.S. interests. It is possible that a situation might arise where we might need to strike first with nuclear weapons. We can't foresee the future. Constricting U.S. strategic options by making some sort of pledge is both stupid and dangerous -- especially since the supposed benefits of such a pledge are based on false assumptions and delusions.

reaffirming the right of first use would say, in effect, that the United States has no apologies for Hiroshima and Nagasaki and is ready for a repeat performance whenever and wherever it chooses.

That's exactly what we should say.

Why Israel Probably Won't Attack

Yesterday, a news story ran about a new Israeli drone that can reach Iran, and there has been increased speculation that Israel will strike to destroy the Iranian nuclear program. I may be wrong, but I think the odds are against an Israeli attack. Here's why.

First, and most importantly, the Iranian nuclear program is not an easy, localized target. It is dispersed in multiple locations throughout the country, and probably hardened to resist attack. The Iranians are well-aware of the possibility of attack, not just from Israel, but from the U.S. I don't overestimate Iranian defensive abilities, but they will do whatever they can to protect those sites. Even poor efforts could be significant given the range from Israel, and the necessity for a sustained air campaign. The military difficulties involved in destroying the Iranian program are daunting, even for the U.S., which has far greater resources than Israel.

Second, Israel has to weigh the costs of a preemptive strike against the benefits. And finally, it has to consider the costs and benefits of not attacking, but of pursuing a policy of defense & deterrence instead. For the first equation, it is the possible cost of not attacking that is most dramatic and often emphasized. That risk is that Iran will not only acquire nuclear weapons, but use them against Israel, or provide them to terrorist proxies. This is rightly seen as an existential threat to Israel. But how serious is that risk? It is extremely unlikely that an Iranian or terrorist first strike would be able to eliminate Israel's nuclear deterrent, especially given the probable location of some nuclear weapons on Israeli submarines. If any significant Israeli nuclear force remains intact after an attack, Iran would suffer a devastating nuclear response, possibly great enough to make a first strike on Israel equivalent to Iranian national suicide. How likely is it that Iran is willing to risk national suicide in order to destroy Israel? Should Israel operate on the basis of what is probably an extremely small risk factor?

If an Iranian nuclear first strike is deemed so unlikely, and I think it should be, then it is also unlikely that the benefits of an Israeli attack outweigh the costs. The probable costs are huge. An Israeli preemptive strike clearly does not have the backing of the Obama administration. How will Israel's greatest ally and protector react to an Israeli policy that not only goes against the direct wishes of the U.S. government, but also might plunge the region into war, destabilize Iraq, divert U.S. attention from Afghanistan, drive up the price of oil, and incur all sorts of other disastrous potential consequences? And that's not even considering the possible direct cost of Iranian retaliation against Israel itself -- all for an attack that most experts think will be able to do no more than delay the Iranian nuclear program.

In contrast, a policy of defense and deterrence seems to offer a far better cost-benefit calculus. By maintaining the capacity to retaliate with overwhelming force, combined with the degree of protection offered by its developing multi-layered missile defenses, Israel should be able to deter any Iranian nuclear attack. For this reason I think it is unlikely that Israel will strike Iran. In order to attack, fear of the worst-case scenario, a suicidal Iranian regime that launches a first strike, has to take precedence over a cold cost-benefit analysis. That's always possible. It may be that Israel will decide that no matter the consequences, no matter if all they are able to achieve is a delay in Iran's nuclear aspirations, that they simply can't risk a nuclear Iran. I know there are people who see things that way, both here and in Israel. I guess we'll have to wait and see.

Why Russia & China Favor a Nuclear Iran

There's an interesting article in the New Republic called, "Bombs Away: The real reason why Russia and China aren’t interested in stopping Iran’s nuclear program." The author, Matthew Kroenig, rejects the common explanation that Russian and Chinese economic ties with Iran are the primary reason for their assistance with its nuclear aspirations, and for their reluctance to do anything about it. Instead he looks toward strategic reasons. He argues that both countries see a nuclear Iran as a constraint on U.S. power in the Middle East -- a constraint that will not affect Russian & China because they lack force projection capabilities in the region.

An Iranian bomb, then, won’t disadvantage China or Russia. In fact, it might even help them. Neither country has hidden its desire to hem in America’s unilateral ability to project power, and a nuclear-armed Iran would certainly mean a more constrained U.S. military in the Middle East. Indeed, at times during the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing and Moscow aided Tehran with important aspects of its nuclear program.

It's nice to see an argument on this issue that gets away from economic determinism and looks toward power politics and grand strategy. I think the author is probably correct in his view of Russian & Chinese motives. Where I disagree with him is on his analysis of the U.S. side of the equation. Here he offers a reverse of Chinese & Russian motivations. The U.S. opposes proliferation in Iran because it constrains U.S. power projection in the region.

Of course, there are the concerns of accidental nuclear detonation, nuclear terrorism, or even nuclear war. But these are all extremely low probability events. The primary threat of nuclear proliferation is that it constrains the freedom of powerful states to use or threaten to use force abroad. ... In nearly every historical instance of proliferation, beginning with China in the 1960s, the United States opposed nuclear proliferation in large part because it wanted to preserve its military freedom of action. ... Although Washington might not have immediate plans to use force in the Middle East, it would like to keep the option open.

Although I agree that this reasoning is certainly part of the U.S. desire to block Iranian nuclear weapons, I think he ignores other obvious reasons of greater significance. First and foremost, Iran is a rogue state ruled by radical Islamic fanatics hostile to the U.S., and has been conducting a low level proxy war against U.S. forces in the region. It's not really necessary to look for deep strategic reasons to understand why the U.S. would want to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the mullahs. If Iran was ruled by a more responsible government that just happened to be aligned against the U.S., the author's argument would be more convincing. 

Second, Kroenig ignores the threat to Israel in his calculations. This is a key reason the U.S. opposes a nuclear weapon in Iranian hands. Israel rightly sees such weapons as an existential threat, and the U.S. would rather not be sucked into a Middle East war if the Israelis decide they must act to preempt the threat.  And third, there is the fear that even if war doesn't break out right way, that an Iranian bomb will precipitate a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race, with other countries feeling that they need to obtain weapons, leading to a general destabilization of the region with unknown consequences. 

In my opinion, the nature of the Iranian regime, its hostility toward the U.S., the threat to Israel, the fear of being drawn into a war, and worries about the stability of the region as a whole are far more significant motivations for U.S. opposition to Iranian nuclear arms than our desire to maintain future force projection capabilities in the region.

Australia Blocks WMD-related Exports to Iran

The lead story in Australian news sources is that the government has employed "special powers" three times to block some exports to Iran.

at least one prohibition notice related to a planned shipment of pumps that could have been used to cool nuclear power plants.

Unlike some countries that pretend to be unsure about whether Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, the Australian government is apparently convinced.

if you look at the threat to regional and global peace which Iran poses in its current nuclear weapons program there is no alternative other than robust international action including in areas such as this.

It's nice to see that one of our allies is at least willing to take economic measures against its own corporations that want to do business in Iran. 

Some Good News on Iran?

The Wall Street Journal reports that an Iranian nuclear scientist has been assassinated in Tehran. He was killed by a remotely-detonated bomb, placed on a motorbike near his car.

Iran, meanwhile, has recently accused the U.S. of complicity in an alleged kidnapping of another Iranian nuclear scientist, who disappeared last year during a religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia.

Are incidents like these evidence that the U.S., or possibly Israel, has a secret assassination program targeting key personnel involved with the Iranian nuclear program? Let's hope so. Covert operations to kill critical people, sabotage facilities, and disrupt supply chains are probably the best way to slow down and hamper Iran's nuclear efforts. It's impossible to say whether or not this killing had anything to do with the U.S. With the current unrest in Iran, it could easily have been the work of internal dissidents of some type. The Iranian government has no lack of enemies. Which also makes it an ideal environment to do some covert damage to their nuclear aspirations. 

The Meaningless Deadline

In case anyone forgot,  yesterday marked the Obama adminstration's deadline for Iran to reach an agreement on giving up its nuclear weapons ambitions. The mullahs and Ahmadinejad are quaking with fear, wondering what Obama will do. Well, not exactly. As Ralph Peters put it in an article that nails the utter incompetence of the Obama administration's Iran policy, here's what the Iranian leadership has been up to instead.

[They] took a break from killing protesters in the streets to attempt to import more than 1,300 tons of make-a-nuke uranium ore from Kazakhstan. 

They've also increased their nuke-cooker centrifuge count, tested new long-range missiles and lied like Persian rugs about hidden nuke sites.

That pretty much covers it. They've basically spit in the face of Obama's so-called "engagement" policy, better known as the empty talk & wishful thinking program. Peters details why any sanctions will be ineffective, and gives a worst-case scenario of what might happen. But he also makes some recommendations about what the U.S. should be doing.

What should this inept administration do? Provide clandestine, covert and overt support to Iran's freedom crusaders. And funnel money and arms to Baluchi, Kurdish, Azeri and Arab separatists willing to take on the Revolutionary Guard jihadis.

I would agree with all of that except the "overt" part. And I would add that we should be doing everything possible to sabotage Iranian nuclear facilities, disrupt their supply chains, and kill or kidnap key personnel. Iran has waged a covert war against the U.S. in Iraq, and the U.S. should be returning the favor.

I retain a small hope that despite the appearance of weakness and incompetence, the Obama administration is secretly taking some effective actions against Iran. Let's hope so, because the policies we can see are worse than useless.

Completely Unsurprising

Leaked intelligence documents confirm Iran's work on nuclear weapons.

The notes, from Iran’s most sensitive military nuclear project, describe a four-year plan to test a neutron initiator, the component of a nuclear bomb that triggers an explosion. Foreign intelligence agencies date them to early 2007, four years after Iran was thought to have suspended its weapons programme.

For quite some time now, only fools have failed to realize that Iran has been working steadily toward obtaining nuclear weapons. Despite the blatantly obvious nature of their intentions, many in the west have been swallowing and regurgitating Iranian propaganda that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes, and doesn't involve nuclear weapons. Will this latest evidence convince those in denial? I doubt it. Those types of fools rely on wishful thinking, rarely letting facts and evidence disrupt their skewed view of reality.

So what will be done? Most likely little or nothing. The same fools will cling to their hopes that Iran isn't really working on nuclear weapons, or that they can somehow be talked out them. They'll probably be reeling with shock when Iran tests its first nuclear device.

Obama Continues Bush Policy on Bioweapons

An op-ed in the LA Times sees that as a bad thing, when it is actually a sign that at least in this area, Obama has elected not to engage in his usual brand of wishful thinking and foolish internationalism. The Times is upset that the Obama administration has declined to "strengthen" the Biological Weapons Convention. Ellen Tauscher, the U.S. undersecretary of State for arms control, explained that,

monitoring doesn't work. "The ease with which a biological weapons program could be disguised within legitimate activities, and the rapid advances in biological research, make it very difficult to detect violations

This is pretty obvious, but the Times thinks it's the thought that counts.

A dedicated team of U.N. inspectors could stay abreast of technological advances and provide that threat. It wouldn't be 100% effective, but no monitoring program is.

Yeah, because UN inspectors are just so reliable. It won't actually be effective, but we should waste money funding another UN program in order to create the false impression that we are actually doing something about the proliferation of bioweapons.

there is no existing team of U.N. investigators nor funding to create one. With the United States ducking the issue, there won't be one any time soon, either.

And that's a good thing.

President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in part because of his strong efforts to combat nuclear proliferation -- yet biological weapons are potentially as serious a danger. He should put his prize-winning brain to use developing a smarter strategy.

Except that President Obama hasn't done a single thing to effectively combat nuclear proliferation, other than talk about it. In fact, by "engaging" with rogue regimes such as those in Iran & North Korea, and pretending that any agreement with such states would be worth anything, the president is, if anything, facilitating nuclear proliferation. We already have a naive strategy based on wishful thinking for nuclear weapons. We don't need one for bioweapons too.

Guarding Pakistani Nukes

According to reporter Seymour Hersh, the U.S. has a secret program in place to secure control of Pakistani nuclear weapons in the event of some sort of crisis. The understanding with the Pakistani military

would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis. At the same time, the Pakistani military would be given money to equip and train Pakistani soldiers and to improve their housing and facilities - goals that General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pakistan Army chief, has long desired

Hersh is not exactly a reliable source, but such a program sounds like a good idea. Naturally the Pakistanis deny it. If true, this is yet another example of a lack of secrecy where secrecy is needed. Although we can't prevent Pakistani leaks, Hersh seems to have U.S. sources. Any suggestion that the U.S. might have any role in guarding the Pakistani arsenal is highly unpopular in Pakistan. But unpopular or not, let's hope it's true. The last thing we need are Pakistani nukes falling into the wrong hands.

Turkey: Friend of Iran

A little while ago, Caroline Glick published a controversial article called, "How Turkey Was Lost to the West." It can be summarized with the following excerpts:

Once the apotheosis of a pro-Western, dependable Muslim democracy, this week Turkey officially left the Western alliance and became a full member of the Iranian axis. ... Turkey is lost and we'd better make our peace with this devastating fact. But if we learn its lessons, we can craft policies that check the dangers that Turkey projects and prepare for the day when Turkey may decide that it wishes to return to the Western fold.

Although some dismissed her analysis as exaggerated, alarmist, or merely reflective of a hardline Israeli position, the Guardian has a story up today that lends weight to her conclusions. The Turkish Prime Minister states categorically of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "There is no doubt he is our friend," while at the same time criticizing European states such as France and Germany. As the Guardian puts it,

Friendly towards a religious theocratic Iran, covetous and increasingly resentful of a secular but maddeningly dismissive Europe: it seems the perfect summary of Turkey's east-west dichotomy.

Turkey, long a loyal and valued U.S. ally, severely damaged that status by its behavior at the outset of the Iraq War. By blocking U.S. deployment through its country at the last minute, it essentially rammed a knife into the back of America, disrupting U.S. invasion plans and causing numerous problems. By that act Turkey demonstrated that it can no longer be trusted as a U.S. ally. It is also in the process of destroying its well-established strategic cooperation with Israel, in favor of cozying up to its enemies. And as the U.S. works to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, what is the position of our "ally" Turkey?

"Iran does not accept it is building a weapon. They are working on nuclear power for the purposes of energy only."

That's Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, spouting Iranian propaganda. The Guardian notes, 

Erdogan's views will interest US foreign policy makers, who have long seen his AKP government as a model of a pro-western "moderate Islam" that could be adopted in other Muslim countries.

It's obviously past time for a reassessment.

Really Bad Advice

H.D.S. Greenway has a column in the Boston Globe called, "Don’t assume the worst about Iran." The title caught my attention because it's about the worst type of foreign policy advice possible. Policy makers have to look at the worst-case scenario to avoid getting caught off-guard. It's just basic commonsense. Planning for the worst and hoping for the best is a prudent policy prescription. Just hoping for the best is naive and dangerous. Greenway is openly advocating that the government approach foreign policy situations on the basis of wishful thinking.

Greenway's entire article is a list of wishful thinking about why we might not need to do anything about Iran. Maybe Iran might not actually produce any bombs. Maybe Arab countries won't want their own nuclear weapons if Iran gets them. Maybe Iran will be deterred by Israel. Maybe Iran will be rational enough not to provide any weapons to terrorists. 

I've been advocating a policy of deterrence toward Iran because I think that A) Iran is going to get nuclear weapons, B) war with Iran is not in our interests at the current time, and C) even if it were we don't have the will to do what would be necessary to eliminate Iran as a potential nuclear threat. But what's Greenway's preferred solution? You guessed it: appeasement.  

Only by engaging with Iran as a country, not just as a nuclear proliferation problem; by recognizing and addressing Iran’s concerns; and identifying where we can agree, as in Afghanistan, is there hope for success

It never ceases to amaze me that anyone can listen to Ahmadinejad, understand that Iran is a country ruled by mullahs, with all that entails, yet still spout this sort of nonsense.

Predicting the Results of Talks With Iran

With the pointless talks now underway regarding Iran's nuclear program, I came across an amusing article in Canada's National Post called, "Why can't America be tough, like France?" It says a lot -- and nothing good -- about the Obama administration, that such a title actually makes sense. Here's the best part of the article, the author's prediction for the negotiation results:

West: "Give up your nuclear program."

Iran: "No."

West: "Okay, how about if we impose some half-hearted, impossible-to-enforce sanctions on goods that China will keep selling you, anyway?"

Iran: "No." 

West: "Well......darn. Hmm. Let's break for lunch."

But that's actually a positive scenario. Here's another one that would be much worse:

West: Give up your nuclear program.

Iran: Ok, but we want this long list of concessions.

West: Great, we can make a deal. We have achieved peace in our time!

Iran: Takes concessions, continues working on nuclear weapons.

We already know that Iran can't be trusted to abide by any sort of agreement, so the best possible outcome of these talks would be a continued impasse. The last thing we need is the naive Obama administration actually agreeing to some sort of deal with Iran, which will strengthen the regime, and probably assist them in getting nuclear weapons even faster. A clear breakdown in the talks might force the administration to finally face reality.

No Surprise in Iran

Wow, Iran has a secret nuclear facility. Who would have guessed? Anyone with the slightest clue has known for years that Iran is attempting to create the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Of course they are concealing aspects of their nuclear program for obvious reasons. Yet we've had to endure a parade of useful idiots telling us that maybe Iran really does just want peaceful nuclear power. We can talk to them. We can make a deal.  You know, all the other nonsense regularly put forth by the appeasement crowd. Will this new "revelation" finally convince them to abandon their naivete and wishful thinking? Will they wake up and understand that the regime in Tehran can't be trusted to abide by any agreement? Probably not. 

An article in the LA Times notes that during the presidential primaries, Hilary Clinton called Obama's position on Iran and other rogue states "irresponsible" & "naive," clear evidence that Clinton has been right at least once on foreign policy. The writer also points out the responses of Obama, Sarkozy, and Brown to the formerly secret nuclear facility. Here's Obama,

Obama warned that unless Iran acts immediately, punishment will be swift. "Iran is breaking rules that all nations must follow," he said.

I'm sure that got a big laugh in Iran. Our enemies aren't scared of the president in the slightest -- and for good reason. Next up, Sarkozy.  

"everything must be put on the table," and that if by December Iran has not reformed, sanctions will be imposed.

No! Not sanctions! No doubt the mullahs are quaking in their robes. And then there is Gordon Brown.

"the international community must draw a line in the sand."

Translation: we are going to do what we do best -- talk.